Challenges of the transition to a low carbon, more electric future:From here to 2050 by Hammond, G.P. & Pearson, P.J.G.
        
Citation for published version:
Hammond, GP & Pearson, PJG 2013, 'Challenges of the transition to a low carbon, more electric future: From
here to 2050', Energy Policy, vol. 52, pp. 1-9. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2012.10.052
DOI:
10.1016/j.enpol.2012.10.052
Publication date:
2013
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication
NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Energy Policy. Changes
resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other
quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work
since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Energy Policy, vol 52,
2013, DOI 10.1016/j.enpol.2012.10.052
University of Bath
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 07. Dec. 2019
1 
 
 ‘Energy Policy’ (Elsevier): Transition Pathways Special Section 
 
Challenges of the Transition to a Low Carbon, More Electric Future:  
From Here to 2050  
 
Geoffrey P. Hammond
a,b
 and Peter J.G. Pearson
c
  
 
a 
Department of Mechanical Engineering, University of Bath, Bath. BA2 7AY. UK 
b 
Institute for Sustainable Energy and the Environment (I•SEE), University of Bath, Bath. BA2 7AY. 
UK 
c 
Low Carbon Research Institute, Welsh School of Architecture, Cardiff University, Cardiff. CF10 
3NB.
 
UK 
1. Introduction  
Electricity generation presently contributes approximately 30% of United Kingdom (UK) 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions (Alderson et al., 2012; POST, 2007), the principal 
‘greenhouse gas’ (GHG) having an atmospheric residence time of about 100 years 
(Hammond, 2000). This share mainly arises from the use of fossil fuel (coal and natural gas) 
combustion for this purpose. Changes in atmospheric concentrations of GHGs affect the 
energy balance of the global climate system. Human activities have led to quite dramatic 
increases since 1950 in the ‘basket’ of GHGs incorporated in the Kyoto Protocol; 
concentrations have risen from 330 ppm to about 430 ppm currently (IPCC, 2007). Prior to 
the first industrial revolution in the 18
th
 Century the atmospheric concentration of ‘Kyoto 
gases’ was only some 270 ppm. The cause of the observed rise in global average near-surface 
temperatures over the second half of the 20
th
 Century has been a matter of dispute and 
controversy. But the most recent (2007) scientific assessment by the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) states with ‘very high confidence’ that humans are having a 
significant impact on the global warming (IPCC, 2007). They argue that GHG emissions 
from human activities trap long-wave thermal radiation from the Earth’s surface in the 
atmosphere (not strictly ‘greenhouse’ phenomena), and that these are the main cause of rises 
in climatic temperatures. In order to mitigate anthropogenic climate change, the Royal 
Commission on Environmental Pollution in the UK (RCEP, 2000) recommended at the turn 
of the Millennium a 60% cut in UK CO2 emissions by 2050. The British Government 
subsequently set a tougher, legally binding target of reducing the nation’s CO2 emissions 
overall by 80% by 2050 in comparison to a 1990 baseline (DTI, 2007; Climate Change Act 
2008).  
A number of observers have studied the way in which the world has undergone a transition 
over time between various energy sources. These cycles, or Kondratieff long-waves 
(Nakicenovic, 1998; Matias and Devezas; 2007), are illustrated in terms of world primary 
energy shares in Fig. 1 (Hammond and Waldron, 2008), along with future projections out to 
2050 according to the Shell ‘Dynamics as Usual’ Scenario (Davis, 2001). ‘Traditional’ 
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energy sources include animal manure, fuel wood, charcoal, water wheels, and windmills. 
Over the next 40 years or so there is likely to be a major growth in energy demand, resulting 
principally from the development of rapidly industrialising countries (such as China and 
India). The depletion of finite fossil fuel resources like oil and natural gas, and the need for 
climate change mitigation, will therefore require a portfolio of energy options: energy 
demand reduction and energy efficiency improvements, carbon capture and storage (CCS) 
from fossil fuel power plants, and a switch to other low or zero carbon energy sources: 
various sorts of renewables (including bioenergy and biofuels) or nuclear power (see Fig. 1).  
The history of electricity generation since the time of Edison has been based around the 
concept of employing large, centralised power stations (see, for example, Hughes, 1983; 
Buchanan, 1994; Hammond, 2000; Pearson and Watson, 2012). Thus, the bulk of electricity 
in Britain is still generated by large thermal power plants that are connected to a high-voltage 
transmission grid, and is then distributed to end-users via regional low-voltage distribution 
networks (Bolton and Foxon, 2011; POST, 2007; Hammond and Waldron, 2008). The whole 
UK energy system is represented schematically in Fig.2 (Hammond, 2000), where the 
electricity network is clearly illustrated. This centralised model has delivered economies of 
scale and reliability (Alderson et al., 2012), but there are significant drawbacks. The UK 
Electricity Supply Industry (ESI), for example, currently has a heavy reliance on primary 
fuels, particularly coal and natural gas. Much of the electricity grid was constructed in the 
1950s and 1960s. It is therefore heavily reinforced in former coal-mining areas, and is 
nearing the end of its design life (DTI, 2003; Hammond and Waldron, 2008). There are 
‘bottlenecks’ restricting power flow from Scotland to England (2.2GWe), and via the 
interconnectors (in the form of high-voltage undersea cables) to France, Northern Ireland and 
the Netherlands (POST, 2007). The grid will require not only renewal but also 
reconfiguration in order to accommodate distributed generation. 
Cheap coal from overseas is unlikely to cause a security of supply problem, but the increasing 
reliance being placed on imports of natural gas for Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) 
power plants brings with it potential risks. Britain became a net importer of natural gas in 
2004 as reserves in the UK continental shelf declined (DTI, 2003; Hammond and Waldron, 
2008; DECC, 2012). In the long-term there is considerable uncertainty about the security of 
imported gas supplies (Hammond and Waldron, 2008). The largest natural gas reserves 
globally are found in Russia, North Africa, and the Middle East. Even without the obvious 
political problems associated with these regions, there will be difficulties in terms of the 
transportation of gas from these areas. Long pipelines, additional port and storage capacity 
will all be required. The natural gas interconnector between Norfolk (in the East Anglian 
region of England) and Belgium means that gas can flow out of Britain to the continental 
market, as well as inward to meet domestic demand. Other gas interconnectors link the UK 
with Norway and the Netherlands. Gas imports are likely to continue to grow quite rapidly in 
the near future (Alderson et al., 2012). 
Achieving the UK carbon reduction target of 80% by 2050 will mean a transition in the 
systems for producing, delivering and using energy that is not only low carbon, but also 
secure and affordable, thus resolving the energy policy ‘trilemma’. A recent independent 
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review (Hills 2012) confirmed, however, that fuel poverty is a serious national problem in the 
UK and suggested that it is set to rise rapidly, adding a further affordability challenge to the 
resolution of the trilemma. 
A consortium of partners from nine university institutions was established under the auspices 
of research funding via a strategic partnership between E.On UK (the electricity generator) 
and the UK Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC), to study the role 
of electricity within the context of ‘Transition Pathways to a Low Carbon Economy’ [under 
Grant EP/F022832/1]. This team was made up of UK engineers, social scientists, policy 
analysts and innovation specialists. It has sought to develop and explore three ‘transition 
pathways’ towards a UK low carbon electricity system (Foxon et al., 2010; Foxon, this 
Section), to understand the changing roles of large and small 'actors' in the dynamics of these 
transitions, and to learn from the successes and failures of past transitions. They have focused 
on the choices and actions needed to ‘get there from here’, and on the analysis of the 
pathways’ technical, socio-economic and environmental implications. An innovative, robust, 
and ‘whole systems’ evidence base has therefore been developed that is distinctive from 
those devised elsewhere in the UK energy research community. The pathways are not 
predictions or roadmaps; rather they are a way of imaginatively exploring future possibilities, 
to inform proactive and protective decision making and enhance the potential for building 
consensus towards common goals. They form the basis for most of the contributions in this 
Special Section of the journal Energy Policy. Three additional papers were invited in order to 
give a continental European (Dijk et al., this issue; Verbong et al., this Section) and an 
industrial (Boston, this Section) perspective respectively. 
2. Pathways, Historical Lessons for Energy System Governance, and Uncertainties  
The starting point in the development of the current UK transition pathways (Foxon et al., 
2010; Foxon, this Section), unlike many scenario-building exercises, is that the governance 
framings or ‘logics’ of key actors will be a crucial influence on any pathway towards a future 
low-carbon, UK energy system. Stakeholder workshops were employed by the consortium to 
distinguish the logics of three core sets of actors: those of the market, government and civil 
society. Consequently, the three transition pathways were named Market Rules (MR), Central 
Co-ordination (CC) and Thousand Flowers (TT); each being dominated by a single group’s 
logic. The paper by Foxon (this Section) builds on the earlier one by Foxon et al. (2010) in 
order to summarise the development and high-level analysis of the present transition 
pathways set, in order to explain their key features and the distinctiveness and value of the 
approach; the approach builds inter alia on approaches originally devised by Dutch 
researchers (e.g., Geels, 2002; Rip and Kemp, 1998). Thus the consortium applied a multi-
level perspective for analysing socio-technical transitions, based on interactions at and 
between three levels: niche innovations, socio-technical regimes, and macro-landscape 
pressures [see Fig. 3 (Foxon et al., 2010)]. The pathways use an ‘action space’ concept 
[originally developed by consortium members Jacquie Burgess and Tom Hargreaves (private 
communication, 2010)] to explore the dynamic interactions between choices made by actors. 
Foxon (this Section) summarises the key technological and institutional changes associated 
with these pathways, and the roles of actors in bringing them about. This leads to an 
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identification of the key risks to the realisation of each of the pathways, and of the challenges 
for individuals, businesses, social movements and policy-makers in taking action to bring 
them about and sustain them. The MR and CC pathways show two main risks and 
uncertainties. On the one side lie the technical, economic and financial challenges of 
delivering the large-scale low carbon generation technologies (such as fossil fuelled power 
plants with CCS, nuclear power and offshore wind) and the grid enhancements to support 
them. On the other lies the uncertainty of whether concerns about security of supply and 
climate change would outweigh public resistance to the nature and costs of any or all of these 
technologies. But in the TT pathway the main uncertainties relate to the technical and 
economic feasibility of locally distributed generation technologies, and to the realisation of 
the behavioural, organisational and technological changes needed to achieve and sustain the 
high levels of energy demand reduction that characterise this pathway.  This, of course, is the 
pathway for which Britain has least prior experience on which to draw.  
 
The present transition pathways consortium has sought to learn from past socio-technical 
transitions in order to help explore future transitions and what might enable or avoid them. 
Early analysis by Bennett and Pearson (2009) studied the potential for renewable raw materials 
(RRM) to substitute fossil hydrocarbons in synthetic products via a case study of the transition 
from coal-based to petrochemical feedstocks in the UK (1921-1967). There they employed a 
system dynamics approach to extract and elucidate the key interrelationships between 
technologies, policy and society. In a similar vein, Chalmers et al. (2009) examined several 
major UK energy transitions
 
in order to
 
draw out lessons for the development of CCS power 
plant in the context of the UK Government-sponsored competition at that time. They examined 
the post-World War II development of nuclear electricity, the increase in size of pulverised 
coal power stations in the decade around 1960, the opening up of North Sea oil and natural gas 
fields in the 1960s and 1970s, and flue gas desulphurisation in the late 1980s and 1990s. These 
historical transition studies provided a number of insights into critically important 
underpinning actions: the requirement for the sort of financial incentives for CCS deployment, 
the importance of active public engagement, together with the desirability of reviewing skills 
and capacity requirements (Chalmers et al., 2009). The CCS competition for the first UK 
demonstrator is now recognised to have been a failure (NAO, 2012), after several of the initial 
bidders dropped out and the Government withdrew from negotiations with the last remaining 
bidder in October 2011. It is being succeeded by another CCS competition that will (hopefully) 
take account of past lessons (Chalmers et al., 2009; Hammond et al., 2011b; NAO, 2012). 
 
The paper by Arapostathis et al. (this Section) illustrates again the co-evolution of 
technologies, infrastructures and institutions, the power of incumbents, and the complex 
challenges of rapidly scaling-up new technologies. Their first case study covers the market-led 
transformation of the manufactured gas regime from 1877 to 1914, which extended the end-
uses of gas beyond lighting to include cooking, and among the working classes as well as the 
middle classes. The second case further reconstructs the transition from town gas to natural gas 
over the period from 1948 to 1977. This state-led and co-ordinated conversion to natural gas 
was preceded by a period of destabilisation of the manufactured gas regime, the co-existence 
of several niche technologies and the hybridisation of the key actors and technological 
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infrastructures of the incumbent regime. Comparing these cases provides insights for future 
energy service transitions by addressing the significance of power, trust and networking in the 
decision making processes involved in the governance of energy transitions. Arapostathis et al. 
(this Section) suggest that while multi-actor, market-led transitions offer valuable chances for 
experimentation and novelty, government-led transitions with fewer actors and more 
centralised decisions may be easier to achieve. This helps to explain why recent governments 
have moved towards a hybrid pathway with greater government involvement in a broadly 
market-dominated system, though achieving an appropriate balance between centralised and 
market approaches and involving civil society in decision-making remain significant 
challenges. 
 
Pearson and Watson (2012) recently adopted this approach of historical analysis to study the 
lessons to be learnt for UK energy policy from experiences over the nearer term: 1980-2010. 
Over these three decades there have been major shifts away from coal and towards natural gas 
in the power sector and industry, as well as a switch from the UK being a net energy importer 
to net exporter and back again. The structure and governance of the energy industries has 
undergone profound change (Pearson and Watson, 2012). The role of the British Government 
has been much diminished with the advent of private sector ownership and forms of 
competition in industries that were hitherto dominated by state-owned, ‘natural monopolies’. 
Pearson and Watson (2012) draw attention to three challenges that confront UK energy policy: 
first, history reinforces the scale of ambition associated with the low carbon transition, which 
might make the UK privatisation and liberalisation processes seem to be relatively 
straightforward; second, because energy policy is not confined to the domain of the energy 
department within government, successful policy co-ordination will be essential; and third, the 
low carbon transition will be full of tensions which policy will need to address, not only in 
relation to the familiar tensions between objectives but also to the relative contributions of 
centralised, top down, large-scale action  and decentralised, bottom up smaller scale initiatives. 
 
In a recent Energy Policy Special Section, Fouquet and Pearson (2012) describe insights for 
the analysis of prospective transitions from research into past transitions, by international 
contributors who met at a 2011 Cardiff workshop initiated by the Transition Pathways project. 
In that Section, Pearson and Foxon (2012), explore recent suggestions that a low carbon 
transition offers challenges and might yield economic benefits comparable to those of previous 
industrial revolutions. They explore the factors that enabled and sustained past industrial 
revolutions, and the role of ‘general purpose technologies’ in them. They conclude that while 
achieving a low carbon transition may require societal changes on a scale comparable with 
those of previous high carbon industrial revolutions; this transition does not yet resemble them. 
They propose, however, that while appropriate government intervention, consistent and 
coherent carbon pricing and support for innovation might create incentives analogous to some 
of those that drove the First Industrial Revolution, an accelerated and different form of 
revolution would be needed to meet the urgent needs of climate stabilisation. 
 
Low carbon transition pathways analysis inevitably involves a consideration of the 
uncertainties surrounding future technological and social changes. The paper by Hughes et al. 
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(this Section) argues that such uncertainties can be better understood, and the strategic and 
policy effectiveness of various futures (pathways or scenarios) thereby improved, through a 
systematic categorisation of their different certain and uncertain elements. It builds on a 
recommendation from an earlier review of low carbon scenarios (Hughes and Strachan, 2010) 
that a clearer identification of the activities of system actors within scenarios will make these 
activities more easily managed or controlled for the purpose of strategic policy making. Both 
Foxon et al. (2010) and Hughes and Strachan (2010) criticised the lack of actor specification 
in low carbon pathways and scenarios. Hughes et al. (this Section) therefore propose a system 
conceptualisation that is based on a detailed description of the dynamics of the actors and 
institutions relevant to the system under study. They argue that this should be iteratively 
linked to a detailed representation of the technological system, and that it should 
consequently be possible to characterise the future elements of the system as being either 
predetermined, actor contingent or non-actor contingent. It emerges that the different 
categories of future element are associated with different types of uncertainty, e.g., extreme 
external (or landscape) pressures [see Fig. 3] and potential socio-technical lock-in. Each of 
these uncertainties prompts different strategic policy responses. Hughes et al. (this Section) 
believe that this categorisation of future elements clarifies the relationship of the energy 
scenario content and specific types of policy response, and may ultimately aid the policy 
relevance of the resulting low carbon transition pathways. 
 
3. The Supply Side, Networks and Smart Controls 
In the first of the invited papers, Boston (this Section) provides an industrial viewpoint piece 
that examines the issues surrounding security of supply of the power system. He suggests that 
security of supply has received less attention than the other aspects of the energy policy 
‘trilemma’ (see Section 1 above). Threats to electricity supplies operate over a continuum of 
timescales, from long-term events that generally operate over years to medium-term events 
that occur in the domain of traded markets, and short-term events that are less than an hour 
and are therefore within gate closure of many markets. Boston notes that Hammond and 
Waldron (2008) used an online survey amongst a wide range of stakeholders to identify and 
rank risks according to likelihood and consequence, and that many of their high-scoring risks 
appear as long to medium-term threats in his analysis, or as underlying causes of these 
threats. Boston (this Section) looks at how threats and mitigation measures can be classified 
in terms of where they act on the supply chain and the timescale over which they act. Only by 
considering the full range of timescales from seconds to decades can the full picture emerge 
of the effects of new technologies on security of supply. A brief examination of major power 
sector blackouts worldwide over the past 40 years (Boston, this Section) shed light on the 
causes of supply failures, and helped identify the most vulnerable parts of the supply chain. 
In order to be included in the study, any blackout had to cause a loss of supply of at least one 
million customer-days and there had to be sufficient information to categorise the event. 
Weather was found to be the most important primary cause of blackouts, with storm damage 
to the transmission system causing half the failures. Other notable weather effects were 
drought (loss of cooling water) and ice build-up on transmission lines. Some of these, 
particularly the droughts in France and ice storms in Canada, are specific to certain systems 
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and areas rather than being universal threats. The next leading cause of incidents was the lack 
of maintenance or asset replacement: a risk that was also ranked as the second highest in the 
online stakeholder appraisal undertaken by Hammond and Waldron (2008). Three of the 
blackout events identified by Boston (this Section) were associated with failures of cables 
which were past their expected life or were more heavily loaded than originally intended. The 
network was consequently found to be the most vulnerable part of the electricity supply 
chain; reinforcing the case for grid renewal and reconfiguration in the UK (Alderson et al., 
2012; Hammond and Waldron, 2008). 
 
The intermittency and inflexibility of low-carbon generation mean that fossil-fuelled 
generation must be replaced to a greater extent than suggested by annual average figures, if 
required carbon reductions are to be achieved. The electric vehicle (EV) market may lead to a 
rapid growth that could bring significant changes to power system demand patterns and 
operation. Likewise, the transition pathways postulate increased electrification of transport 
and heating, which could result in greater peak demands on the network that would be 
disproportionally higher than the increase in energy consumption. Significant generation, 
transmission and distribution network reinforcements (operating with much lower utilisation 
factors) will be needed, including tens of billions of pounds of distribution network 
investment. However, a co-ordinated application of smart demand technologies, such as 
smart EV charging, smart heat pump control and active distribution networks with the use of 
voltage regulators can significantly reduce network reinforcement costs (Pudjianto et al., this 
Section). 
 
Two modelling tools have been combined in the work reported by Barnacle et al. (this 
Section) to assess the robustness of the three transition pathways in terms of generation and 
infrastructure requirements. Here the Future Energy Scenario Assessment (FESA) tool (see 
also Barton et al., this Section) is used to develop pathway specific large-scale generation 
mixes that meet expected demands on both a yearly and hourly time-step basis. This hourly 
modelling indicates massive requirements for peaking plant or energy storage, even after the 
optimistic application of automated demand-side flexibility. The Multi-Objective 
Transmission Reinforcement Planning (MOTRiP) tool has been used to generate a population 
of 100 electricity network reinforcement plans. The key trade-offs are described, and the best 
reinforcement plan determined for the MR pathway 2020 generation mix. Barnacle et al. (this 
Section) show that the a third (34%) of the reduction in operational or ‘stack’ CO2 emissions 
on that timescale can only be achieved if the network is reinforced to allow this via the 
provision of adequate network capacity. Their work has also sought to ensure security against 
thermal overloading and other contingencies, through a combination of the ‘full’ temporal 
analysis produced by FESA and the comprehensive geographical analysis that MOTRiP 
provides. Consequently these models yield a high-quality holistic examination of the 
pathways, and thereby determine the need for national infrastructure reinforcements with 
future changes in demand and generation patterns. 
 
Electrification of transport fleets and heating sectors (as indicated above) is seen as one of the 
key strategies to further reduce the use of fossil fuels and the resulting GHG emissions. 
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However, it will potentially cause a significant increase of electricity peak demand, as 
Barnacle et al. (this Section) show, and have adverse consequences for the electricity system. 
The paper by Pudjianto et al. (this Section) suggests that the adoption of electric heating and 
EVs under all three transition pathways will increase peak electricity demand in the UK by 2-
3 times up to 2050. This will particularly impact on distribution networks. They argue that 
massive distribution network reinforcement will be required, costing up to £36 bn over the 
period 2010-2050. Consequently, Pudjianto et al. (this Section) address the benefits of 
various applications of ‘smart’ network control and demand response technologies for 
enhancing the integration of future load categories, and for improvements in operation 
management and efficient use of distribution network assets. A range of numerical 
simulations have been employed on different distribution network topologies (rural and urban 
networks) to identify the need and the cost of network reinforcement required to 
accommodate future load under various operating strategies such as Business as Usual 
(passive demand and passive network) against the smart grid approach. Pudjianto et al. 
studied applications of smart Plug-in Vehicle (PiV) charging, smart heat pumps, and 
optimised control of network voltage regulators to reduce network investment. They advocate 
the revision of network planning and design standards. Distribution Network Operators 
(DNOs), for example, need to be incentivised to take advantage of smart control solutions as 
an alternative to strengthening the grid. But recently Bolton and Foxon (2011) charted the 
‘co-evolution’ between technologies and institutions in electricity distribution networks since 
the introduction of privatization and market liberalization over twenty years ago. They 
observed that efforts to promote radical and ‘architectural’ innovation, such as the transition 
to a smart grid, face significant barriers at the firm and sector levels. 
 
4. The Demand Side 
 
The demand for energy at the building scale arises from a multiplicity of lifestyles, 
behaviours, service needs, end-use devices, the building fabric and local energy 
conversion/storage. There is potential for emissions mitigation in all of these facets, and 
many opportunities exist to reduce the energy needed to satisfy basic energy services in 
existing and new build stock over the transition period. Over the last few years (Torriti et al., 
2010), load growth, increases in intermittent generation, declining technology costs, and the 
increasing recognition of the importance of customer behaviour in energy markets have 
brought about in Europe a change in emphasis towards Demand Response (DR). Torriti et al. 
(2010) suggest that, while business programmes, technical and economic potentials vary 
across Europe, co-ordinated DR policies have been slow to emerge. They argue that this is 
because of the limited knowledge on DR energy saving capacities, high cost estimates for DR 
technologies and infrastructures, and policies focused on creating the conditions for 
liberalising the EU energy markets. But a shift away from fossil fuels as a result of the 
electrification of transport is evident in all of the present transition pathways, as is growth in 
the use of electricity for heating, via heat pumps. 
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Barton et al. (this Section) explore the possible evolution of UK electricity demand as it 
moves along the three transition pathways. Detailed modelling of hourly balancing of these 
demands was undertaken using the FESA tool (see Section 3 above). These studies provided 
an important component of the ‘technical elaboration’ of the transition pathways narratives 
(Foxon et al., 2010; Foxon, this Section). [An appendix (Barton et al., this Section) provides 
an outline of the physical basis of the FESA tool, its limitations, its location within the range 
of alternative energy systems models, and a description of the methods employed for FESA 
validation.] Demand balancing was found to represent a significant challenge. The MR 
pathway, for example, sees continued growth in absolute levels of electricity use, despite 
continued technical improvements in appliances and building fabric; peak demands also 
grow, to some 83GW by 2050. Enhanced energy efficiency contributes to lower trends in the 
CC and TT pathways, and greater use of non-electricity sources for heating, notably CHP, in 
TT drives demand down further, such that peak demand is only 38GW. However, this 
reduction comes at a price, with significant ‘excess’ generation locally at times of low 
electricity demand, as CHP follows heat demands, exacerbating the problem of low capacity 
factors for central generation caused by growth in the role of intermittent renewables. A 
variety of ‘demand side participation’ (DSP) measures have been modelled (Barton et al., this 
Section) in order to determine whether the need for conventional generation with very low 
capacity factors can be minimised. DSP is found to yield significant benefits in this regard. 
Load shifting, for example, is shown to address this problem effectively, but will require 
widespread acceptance of the automatic control of appliances and/or ‘deep’ behavioural 
changes. Lastly, Barton et al. (this Section) display projections for the imports of fossil fuels 
into the UK and the operational (or ‘stack’) GHG emissions under each of the three transition 
pathways. 
 
5. ‘Whole Systems’ Energy and Environmental Appraisal 
  
The whole systems appraisal of energy technologies and the transition pathways has been 
undertaken (Hammond et al., this Section) within an overarching sustainability framework 
(Hammond and Jones, 2011), together with a set of evaluation criteria for specific energy 
technologies and pathways. It builds on earlier studies of simpler power networks (El-Fadel et 
al., 2011) and individual energy technologies (Hammond et al., 2011a). The impact of the 
three pathways has been assessed using energy analysis and environmental life cycle 
assessment (LCA) on a ‘whole systems’ basis: from ‘cradle-to-gate’ (Hammond et al., this 
Section). ‘Whole system’ GHG emissions are the sum of upstream and operational emissions. 
The latter (‘stack’) emissions are those directly associated with the combustion of fossil fuels 
within power stations. Thus, the whole system emissions amount to those related to the 
‘Energy Transformation System’ as defined by way of Fig. 2 above. Hammond et al. (this 
Section) highlight the significance of ‘upstream emissions’ and their (technological and 
policy) implications, in contrast to the emphasis on power plant operational emissions 
conventionally presented by other analysts. Upstream environmental burdens arise from the 
need to expend energy resources in order to extract and deliver, for example, fuel to a power 
station. They include the energy requirements for extraction, processing/refining, transport, 
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and fabrication, as well as methane leakages that occur in coal mining activities – a major 
contribution – and from natural gas pipelines.  
The impacts of upstream emissions on the carbon performance of various low carbon 
electricity generators [such as large-scale combined heat and power (CHP) plant and CCS 
power stations], and of the pathways themselves distinguish the present findings by 
Hammond et al. (this Section) from those of other UK analysts [such as Barton et al. (this 
Section), the UK Government’s Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), and 
their independent Committee on Climate Change (CCC)]. Hammond et al. (this Section) 
argue that it is not possible fully to decarbonise the UK electricity supply industry by 2030 (as 
advocated by the CCC), unless the whole economy adopts low carbon energy sources – an 
unlikely prospect on a 2030 timescale. Neither the CCC or DECC currently account for 
upstream GHG emissions, or perform their calculations on a ‘whole systems’ basis of the sort 
employed by Hammond et al. (this Section). They only determine the operational or stack 
emissions associated with the Energy Transformation System (Fig. 2).  
If the UK is to genuinely meet its stringent carbon reduction targets, then it will therefore be 
necessary to account for upstream emissions from power generation of the type evaluated here 
by Hammond et al. Otherwise, even if the current UK carbon reduction targets are met, there 
will remain further emissions upstream. Taking account of upstream emissions also suggests 
the striking result that CCS is likely to deliver only about a 70% reduction in carbon 
emissions on a whole system basis, in contrast to the normal presumption of a 90% reduction 
(Hammond et al., 2011b). Hammond et al. (this Section) finally present estimates of a range 
of other pollutants or wastes released into the environment as a consequence of the power 
network (via 17 separate impact indicators, together with a tentative ‘single score’, aggregate 
LCA measure). These address issues related to the impacts, for example, of non-renewable 
energy (NRE) resources, human toxicity, and the health impacts associated with particulate 
matter formation (PMF). 
 
6. Patterns of Energy Use and Behaviour 
 
In an invited paper giving a continental European perspective, Verbong et al. (this Section) 
analyses practices and perceptions associated with smart grid experiments in the Netherlands. 
The co-authors work from within the Dutch transitions research community. Thus, for 
example, Verbong and Geels (2007) analysed the historical dynamics within the Dutch 
electricity system from 1960 to 2004. There they noted that visions of the future electricity 
system differ greatly: from the development of a large-scale European Supergrid to the 
construction of local micro-grids. But Verbong et al. (this Section) conducted in-depth 
interviews with the stakeholders of 12 smart grid projects that support the Dutch Smart Grids 
programme, using a ‘Strategic Niche Management’ (SNM) framework. These projects still 
are in an early phase, and so the focus was on the role of users in their design. SNM studies 
focus on processes that are internal to the development of niche innovations (see Section 2 
and Fig. 3 above), such as the articulation of expectations and visions, the building of social 
networks, and learning processes. Verbong et al. argue that too much emphasis on the 
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technological aspects of innovation and their economic incentives can become a barrier to 
wider understanding. Social variables like daily routines, individual preferences, and social 
relations in a household have been found to be important for energy demand reduction, 
including those beneficially influenced by smart meters (as determined, for example, by 
Hargreaves et al., 2010). This may reflect a co-evolution of technology with social practices, 
changing routines, and behaviour. Verbong et al. (this Section) therefore contend that users, 
their daily routines, and their social context (e.g., household or community) should be taken 
more seriously in smart grid experiments. Consequently, they assert that learning about the 
social dimensions of smart grids, and the international exchange of experiences, can help 
prevent a premature lock-in into a particular transition pathway and system configuration. 
 
Nye et al. (2010) recently argued from psychological and sociological perspectives for the 
need to consider energy system transitions within a wider context around consumer-oriented 
lifestyles. They suggested that domestic actors can play an active role in such transitions 
through establishing new routine and conventional uses of energy in everyday life. Lower 
carbon technologies, like smart energy meters and micro-generation equipment, can lead to 
the disruption of unsustainable energy-using routines. Moreover, these devices could help to 
make energy consumption and energy costs more visible and relevant to the everyday lives of 
domestic users. In a related field trial (Hargreaves et al., 2010), using qualitative interviews 
with 15 householders using Smart Energy Monitors (SEMs), they highlighted the importance 
of the social dynamics on household energy use. These researchers explored how SEMs 
become embedded within household routines and relations and can lead to negotiation and 
conflict that hinders energy saving efforts, as often as to rational-planning and co-operative 
steps to cut consumption. They found that households with SEMs rapidly returned to pre-
existing energy use levels. Most early adopters used the displays to help picture their 
household’s ‘normal’ pattern of energy use (Hargreaves et al., 2010), and tended often 
angrily to resist exhortations from external agencies (government, energy companies, NGOs) 
to change it. 
 
Here Hargreaves et al. (this Section) report a follow-on UK study of how, over a 12-month 
period, householders interacted with feedback on their domestic electricity consumption in a 
field trial of real-time displays or smart energy meters. Drawing on the findings of 11 follow-
up qualitative interviews with householders involved in a ‘Visible Energy Trial’, Hargreaves 
et al. (this Section) observe that over time, smart energy meters gradually become ‘back-
grounded’ within normal household routines and practices. They found that the SEMs do 
increase householders’ knowledge of, and confidence about, the amount of electricity they 
consume, but (beyond a certain level and for a wide variety of reasons) the monitors do not 
necessarily encourage or motivate householders to reduce their levels of consumption. 
Finally, Hargreaves et al. (2010) suggest that household practices may become harder to 
change as householders realise the energy saving potential, once equipped with new 
knowledge and expertise about their levels of electricity consumption. These householders 
may also become frustrated by the absence of wider policy and market support. The closer 
engagement of end-users with governance of the energy system in the TT pathway perhaps 
offers one means to overcome these barriers.  
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Another invited contribution from continental Europe, by Dijk et al. (this Section), addresses 
the emergence of what is termed an ‘electric mobility trajectory’. They note that the regime 
around the internal combustion (IC) engine-driven car has dominated road transport for more 
than 100 years. This technological lock-in comes, in part, from the production side. It has not 
been regarded as economically attractive to invest in new automotive power trains that appear 
non-competitive in cost terms. It is argued that competition has been fierce in the past 
decades with many large, multi-national car manufacturers struggling to survive (Dijk et al., 
this Section). Such companies have found it both more attractive and safer to invest in 
innovation in the existing IC engine technology than in technological options that carry the 
risk of low consumer acceptance. This yields a pattern in which car manufacturers 
continuously refine the dominant design in order to improve environmental performance of 
IC engines (Dijk and Yarime, 2010), rather than making a ‘great leap forward’. Thus, the 
development of hybrid technology can be seen as an attempt by car assemblers to innovate 
without having to move away from their core competencies. On the infrastructure side, the 
‘refuelling’ sub-system includes storage at the filling station and the refuelling process itself. 
Here liquid biofuels hold out the prospect of retaining the existing transport infrastructure 
(e.g., refuelling or ‘petrol’ stations), in contrast to other low carbon options, such as EVs and 
hydrogen-fuelled vehicles (Hammond et al., 2012).  
 
The last five years (i.e., 2005–2010) has been a greater period of innovation in electric 
mobility. The central thesis of Dijk et al. (this Section) is that this electric mobility has 
crossed a critical threshold and is now benefitting from various developments whose 
influence can be expected to grow in importance: high oil prices, carbon constraints, and the 
rise of organised car sharing and inter-modality. Dijk et al. find that the development of 
vehicle engine technology is dependent on alterations in mobility preferences, changes in the 
global car market, reshaping of the refuelling infrastructure, fluctuations in energy prices, 
adjustments in climate policy, and structural developments in the electricity sector. The co-
authors consider the potential consequences of the interaction of technological alternatives, 
including future synergies between battery PiV, hybrid electric, and hydrogen fuel cell 
vehicles. These are likely to be important drivers for the future evolution of the interlinked 
energy and transport sectors out to 2050 and beyond. 
 
7. Branching Points and Some Next Steps 
 
The transition pathways developed by the consortium have recently been enhanced by the 
development of ‘branching points’ - points at which decisions may be taken to diverge from 
the existing trajectory, towards another pathway or a hybrid, or to return to a pathway after 
deviating from it. Branching points may be negative (e.g., the failure of a low carbon 
technology to come on stream as expected) or, more fundamentally, a loss of faith in the 
prevailing logic, such as a move away from the market towards greater central co-ordination 
or local action. In contrast, they may be positive, as in unexpectedly successful developments 
in technology of infrastructure. The paper by Foxon et al. (this Section) describes initial 
analysis of branching points from the three low carbon, more electric transition pathways. 
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They explore and analyse branching points identified through project and stakeholder 
workshops, and drawing on an analysis of actors’ choices and responses at past branching 
points in energy system transitions (Arapostathis et al., this Section). The potential responses 
of the actors are identified at these branching points, and risk mitigation strategies (see also 
Hammond and Waldron, 2008) are formulated for the dominant actors to reinforce that 
pathway, as well as opportunities for actors to move away from the pathway. Understanding 
the pressures, tensions and processes that lead to branching points, it is suggested by Foxon et 
al. (this Section), means being better able to anticipate, address – or even precipitate – them. 
  
In May 2012 a follow-on research project was initiated with funding from the EPSRC entitled 
‘Realising Transition Pathways: Whole Systems Analysis for a UK More Electric Low 
Carbon Energy Future’ (under Grant EP/K005316/1). It involves the same nine academic 
partner institutions, and will seek to explore the constraints and opportunities in realising a 
low carbon UK energy sector, including those stemming from European developments. This 
new research project will include studies on the horizon scanning of innovative energy 
technologies over the period to 2050, the feasibility of demand responses (after Barton et al., 
this Section), uncertainties in economic analysis, the estimation of investment costs of the 
different pathways, and the implications of markets for investment decisions about energy 
technologies. Further work will be undertaken on conceptualising, mapping and analysing 
‘actor dynamics’ in the contemporary UK electricity sector (after Hargreaves et al., this 
Section), historical transitions and case studies (after Arapostathis et al., this Section), 
integrated energy networks modelling and evaluation [after Barnacle et al. (this Section) and 
Pudjianto et al. (this Section)], and ‘whole systems’ energy and environmental appraisal of 
low carbon technologies and pathways (after Hammond et al., this Section). The consortium 
also intends to continue the development of their initial work on the branching points 
approach described above (Foxon et al., Arapostathis et al., this Section), and to identify and 
explore other potential branching points on the core transition pathways. In addition, the 
‘Realising Transition Pathways’ project will seek to identify and examine other past 
branching points, in search of patterns, insights and typologies that might inform 
understanding of, and agency in relation to, prospective branching points on the transition 
pathways to a low carbon, more electric future for the UK. 
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Fig. 1 World primary energy shares 1850-2050: future projections based on the Shell 
‘Dynamics as Usual’ Scenario. [Source: Hammond and Waldron, 2008; concatenated 
from the data in Nakicenovic et al., 1998 and Shell projections reported by Davis, 2001]. 
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Fig. 2. A simplied representation of the UK energy system. [Source: Hammond, 2000]. 
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Fig. 3. Possible transition pathways and the factors that influence them. [Source: The 
Transition Pathways Consortium (Foxon et al., 2010)]. 
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